Market Manipulation as a Security Problem by Mavroudis, Vasilios
Market Manipulation as a Security Problem
Vasilios Mavroudis
University College London
v.mavroudis@cs.ucl.ac.uk
Abstract. Order matching systems form the backbone of modern eq-
uity exchanges, used by millions of investors daily. Thus, their operation
is strictly controlled through numerous regulatory directives to ensure
that markets are fair and transparent. Despite these efforts, market ma-
nipulation remains an open problem.
In this work, we focus on a class of market manipulation techniques
that exploit technical details and glitches in the operation of the ex-
changes (i.e., mechanical arbitrage). Such techniques are used by preda-
tory traders with deep knowledge of the exchange’s structure to gain an
advantage over the other market participants. We argue that technical
solutions to the problem of mechanical arbitrage have the potential to
significantly thwart these practices. Our work provides the first overview
of the threat landscape, models fair markets and their security assump-
tions, and discusses various mitigation measures.
1 Introduction
From outcry pits to electronic exchanges, trading has always been a very com-
petitive field, where even the slightest “edge” could be used to gain an advantage
over the rest of the market participants. However, electronic trading gave rise to
a previously unseen type of arbitrage that exploits minor technical details and
glitches in the exchange’s infrastructure [18].
These techniques are employed by traders with a very good understanding
of the exchange’s operations (e.g., matching system’s processes, order handling
rules) and usually with low-latency access to the exchange’s engine (on the or-
der of milliseconds or less). For example, traders have been found to exploit
corner cases of the order-handling rules to unfairly receive execution priority
over other market participants [14]. Moreover, predatory traders use minuscule
orders to uncover investors who submit hidden instructions for large blocks of
equity [18,17].
While in retrospect this development was to be expected, the prevalence of
such techniques caught markets off-guard, and led to various analyses and pro-
posals by both researchers and regulatory bodies [11]. Our work complements
these (legal and finance) research efforts and argues that these phenomena can-
not be sufficiently studied without examining their technical component. We
decouple the study of manipulation techniques from their legal standing, and
model fair exchanges based on security properties and assumptions derived from
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EU and US market regulations. On this basis, we examine six known mechanical
manipulation techniques and investigate how they violate one or more of the
aforementioned properties. The insights of this analysis are useful for the devel-
opment of efficient countermeasures with minimum impact to the operation of
the markets.
To better understand the existing mitigation options and their effectiveness,
we also discuss and compare various technical and regulatory proposals. We
conclude that technical countermeasures cannot fully replace regulators but can
significantly reduce the opportunities for manipulation. This is also indicated
by the small body of works introducing alternative market designs that are less
prone to certain forms of mechanical arbitrage [36,20,18].
Contributions. To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions:
– We define the security properties that fair exchanges should satisfy and in-
troduce the adversarial model assumed by the majority of modern equity
exchanges.
– We study six known manipulation techniques, introduce their technical de-
tails, and investigate how they violate the exchange’s security properties. To
our knowledge, this is the first time that market manipulation techniques
are studied in the “systems security” context.
– We survey existing countermeasures and discuss their effectiveness in tack-
ling manipulation techniques based on mechanical arbitrage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Initially, we detail the operation
of order matching systems and discuss the different order types (Section 2).
Subsequently, we list the basic security properties that a fair exchange should
provide, and introduce a realistic model of an intelligent adversary (Section 3).
Section 4 studies the technical details of mechanical arbitrage techniques, while
Section 5 discusses both technical and regulatory countermeasures. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Background
We now outline the basic subsystems of electronic exchanges and their operation.
Figure 1 illustrates the interactions between the different components and actors
of an electronic trading system. Initially, traders (ti) submit their instructions
(i.e., send, cancel, modify) to the order management system (OMS) of their
broker. The OMS captures the details of each incoming instruction, identifies
the best execution venue, and routes it to that exchange1. The received orders
are then placed in the exchange’s order book, where the matching engine ranks,
pairs and fills them with other sell or buy orders. An order is fully matched
and cleared from the book if its entire open quantity is executed, while partially
matched orders are updated to list only the remaining open quantity. Most
1In practice, order routing is more complex, and optimal execution in a volatile
market is non-trivial [25].
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equity and cryptocurrency exchanges operate continuous markets, where orders
are matched on a continuous basis and the price is determined by the highest
bid and the lowest ask quotes.
Traders remain up to date with these prices either through the Stock Infor-
mation Provider (SIP)2 or by subscribing to the trading data feeds offered by
the exchanges. There are two types of such feeds: Layer 1 that provide only basic
information such as real-time best bid/ask prices for securities trading in the ex-
change, and Layer 2 that offer quotes for all the orders resting in the order book
(or up to a certain depth). In terms of latency, SIP averages at 0.09 milliseconds,
while proprietary data feeds are several times faster [30].
Finally, to ensure that traders, brokers and exchanges operate within the
legal boundaries, regulators (e.g., the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)
constantly surveil the market and investigate cases of abuse such as market
manipulation and insider trading. Moreover, exchanges often monitor and review
trader positions and transactions (i.e., self-regulate) to avoid facilitating illegal
activities [5,6,7].
Dark pools are trading venues that protect the traders’ privacy by not adver-
tising the open orders in their book. Pre-trade privacy is of great importance
to institutional investors, as it enables them to submit large orders without ad-
versely influencing the market price. Beside that, their operation is similar to
that of standard exchanges (i.e., lit markets). Dark pools were initially used for
equity trading, but the recent cryptocurrency burst gave rise to various new dark
coin-trading venues [40].
2.1 Orders Types
Trade orders are instructions sent by traders/investors to buy or sell on a venue,
and are either routed through a broker or sent directly to the exchange (when
participants have direct market access). We now outline a few of the hundred
order types (and variants) that modern exchanges support.
Market Orders. This order type specifies the quantity to be sold or bought, but
not the price. The exchange is responsible for filling the order at the best available
price. While market orders are commonly used to quickly unload a “position”,
traders prefer other types that give them better control over the execution price.
Limit Orders. A limit order specifies a maximum or minimum price for buying
or selling a number of shares. Unlike market orders, limit orders may not be
executed if the price set cannot be met. Some variants allow investors to place
time-limits for order execution after which the order is canceled.
Reserve Orders. Such orders are comprised of a displayed and a reserved (i.e.,
non-displayed) component (also called Iceberg orders). Once the displayed quan-
tity is depleted to less than a round lot (i.e., the smallest order size allowed) the
2The Stock Information Provider is a central, consolidated stream and aggregator
displaying the best priced bid and ask quotes, and the trading activity of each exchange.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the main actors participating in an electronic trading system.
Traders (ti) submit their instructions through the order management systems (OMSs)
of their brokers who then forward them to the exchange with the best price. Alterna-
tively, traders with direct market access can submit orders directly to the exchanges. In
both cases, the matching engine of the exchange pairs buy and sell orders, and updates
the order book with the remaining quantities. All these processes are monitored by the
regulators to ensure the fairness and transparency of the markets.
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reserved component is used to replenish it. There are several variants realizing
different replenishment strategies (e.g., fixed amount, random replenishment).
Discretionary Orders. This type of orders have both a displayed price and a
non-displayed discretionary execution range. The exchange first tries to fill the
order at the displayed price, but if this is not possible it looks for fills within the
hidden discretionary range.
Anonymous Orders. These orders are used by investors who elect not to reveal
their identity in a particular trade. Anonymous orders display a generic id in
place of the unique participant’s id. Regulators and authorities monitoring the
market retain access to the full details of the order.
Dark/Hidden Orders. This class of orders provides varying degrees of pre-trade
privacy, concealing parts of or all the details of an order before it is executed.
They are available in both dark and lit markets and are used by investors wish-
ing to buy or sell large volumes of stocks, options, or cryptocurrencies without
influencing the market direction or sentiment. It should be noted that they do
not provide any post-trade privacy, as this is prohibited by EU and US market
regulations.
2.2 Order Matching Algorithms
Order matching is the process by which exchanges pair compatible buy and sell
instructions. For this purpose, each matching system uses an algorithm that con-
siders several precedence criteria to determine which orders must be filled at any
given time. This ranking process becomes of particular importance, when there
are several open orders for the same security (or cryptocurrency) at the same
price. Here, we outline the two most common categories of matching algorithms,
while a more thorough analysis can be found in [29].
Price-Time Priority. Most equity and cryptocurrency markets use Time-based
FIFO ranking. FIFO is an intuitive ranking strategy, where orders are first pri-
oritized based on their offered price (i.e., a buyer that is willing to pay more is
served first) and then based on their relative submission time (in cases of orders
with the same price). For instance, given a buy order A for 200 shares at a price
x that arrives before an order B for 50 shares at the same price, the system will
seek to fully fill A first, and then move on to find matches for B. Conditional
order types further complicate the ranking process, as ranking algorithms need
to also consider several other order precedence rules. For example, displayed
orders (e.g., limit orders) have priority over all hidden order types (e.g., dark
orders). Similarly, other ranking criteria are used to rank the different hidden
order variants.
Pro-Rata. As with price-time priority, Pro-Rata algorithms prioritize first the
orders that offer the best price, but do not consider their relative submission
time. Instead, they split the quantity sold between the buy orders at the same
price level i.e., The volume of the shares allocated to each buy order is propor-
tional to the number of available shares currently available at that price. In our
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previous scenario, with two buy orders A (for 200 shares) and B (50 shares) at
the same price, an incoming sell order for 200 shares will be matched with 160
shares from A and 40 shares from B (i.e., 80% of each). In other words, if the
offer does not suffice to cover the demand, all orders will be filled partially[12,27].
Besides this basic version of the pro-rata algorithm, there are several other vari-
ants with additional constraints such as maximum volume caps and minimum
volume thresholds.
3 Security Considerations
We now examine market regulations to derive the security properties of mod-
ern exchanges and the threat model they operate under. We base our analysis
primarily on literature for the US and EU markets, but our modeling remains
relevant to exchanges worldwide.
3.1 Security Properties
In 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) consolidated all
pre-existing equity market regulations into the Regulation National Market Sys-
tem [1], aiming to simplify market surveillance and increase investor protection.
In the European Union, the “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive” (Mi-
FID II) provides a regulatory framework for investment services [2]. Based on
these two regulations, we introduce a list of properties that, we believe, pro-
vide a well-rounded definition of fair and transparent markets. Comprehensive
overviews of the U.S. Regulatory Landscape can be found in [36,14].
– Trading Integrity. All the orders entered by market participants should
express honest trading intent, and should not be used to artificially influence
the volume of trades, the prices or any other market activity index.
– Operational Transparency. All the details and rules governing the oper-
ation of an exchange should be accessible by all market participants.
– Fair Market Access. All market participants should have equal access to
the exchange when sending, modifying and canceling orders.
– Symmetric Information Access. All market participants should have
equal access to up-to-date data on exchange’s order book activity.
– Order Queue Integrity. Orders should be always ranked and executed
according to the public order-matching rules of the exchange.
– Participant Anonymity. Non-authorized parties should not have access
to the identity of traders using anonymous orders.
– Data Confidentiality. Non-authorized parties should not have access to
the pre-trade data of dark orders. In the case of dark pools, other traders
should not have access to any information related to a transaction (apart
from the buyer and the seller).
The US and European market regulations assume that the majority of traders
and exchange operators abide by the regulations, but may occasionally violate
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one or more of the above properties even if it is explicitly prohibited by the law.
Additionally, investors assume that other traders and exchange operators may
operate in a legal but unethical manner (e.g., predatory trading).
3.2 Adversarial Model
While in theory all traders have the same access to the market, the complex-
ity of modern exchanges provides various opportunities for gaining competi-
tive edges. We now outline the main characteristics of intelligent traders that
make optimal use of their resources without overstepping any legal bound-
aries [18,10,34,28,31,35]:
– High Computational Power. They heavily and continuously invest in com-
puter hardware and software, so as to process market data and execute orders
as fast as possible.
– Very Low Latency. They minimize transmission latency by building their
own high-bandwidth lines and by housing their computers in the exchange’s
premises, very close to the matching engine (i.e., colocation). All these can
reduce transmission latency to under one millisecond [28,32].
– Knowledgeable & Strategic. They have a very good understanding of the
exchange’s internal processes and systems, and make optimal use of order
types to leverage every (intended and unintended) feature they provide.
In finance literature [27,8,22], high-frequency traders are often considered the
most sophisticated class of market participants, fitting all the aforementioned
characteristics.
4 Manipulation Techniques
We now describe several market manipulation techniques that exploit the un-
derlying infrastructure of exchanges and violate one or more of the properties
listed in Section 3.1.
As part of a complex exploitation strategy, predatory traders often use at-
tacks to: 1) deanonymize investors entering anonymous orders, and 2) uncover
large hidden orders.
Latency Fingerprinting. This class of deanonymization techniques uses the
order-transmission latency as a side-channel to uncover the identity of investors
that use anonymous orders (i.e., violates the Participant Anonymity property).
The adversary maintains a latency table that maps the different brokers/funds to
the time it takes for a message to reach the exchange from their network [8,37].
Upon observing an anonymous order and calculating its inter-arrival time, the
adversary uses the latency table to identify the broker that submitted it. From
a technical perspective, the transmission latency of an anonymous order is re-
trieved by subtracting the “submission” timestamp (found in each Financial
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Information eXchange Protocol message3) from the time the order was listed in
the order book of the exchange.
Pinging. As outlined in Section 2.1, investors placing large orders often elect
to use hidden order types to avoid influencing the market price and falling prey
to predatory practices. These orders are not displayed in the order book and
are matched only if another order at the same price is submitted. Alternatively,
investors often break up large buy orders into much smaller ones and enter them
gradually into the market [10]. Pinging is one of the techniques used by predatory
traders to uncover such investors, and is particularly effective in exchanges that
send order execution notifications immediately and market activity updates at
regular downsampled intervals. The trader enters several sell orders of the smaller
marketable size for the stocks they are interested in monitoring. Once one or
more of those orders are matched, the trader is alerted (i.e., pinged) about the
presence of a potentially large hidden buy-side order. This technique violates
the Data Confidentiality property and is usually combined with other techniques
that exploit large buy orders (e.g., scalping).
Quote stuffing. This technique is used only by sophisticated traders with di-
rect access to the market (i.e., not through a broker), and involves placing and
canceling high volumes of orders. Its objective is to disrupt trading and create
arbitrage opportunities by flooding the data feeds of other participants, who are
now unable to follow the market (Symmetric Information Access property) [24].
Thus, it exploits bottlenecks in the data processing pipeline of regular investors.
In some cases, these attacks may also affect the responsiveness of the matching
engine to market participants [33,39].
Sniping. Sniping [18] is a form of mechanical arbitrage that relies on high-speed
transmission lines and co-location to gain an edge over slower investors. Let a
cryptocurrency or security traded on an exchange at price x and a public signal
y that is strongly correlated to x. Consequently, when y increases, traders imme-
diately update their open sell quotes for that security from x to a new increased
price x¯. However, this process is not instantaneous and hence momentarily (i.e.,
a few milliseconds) there are open sell quotes at the stale price x. Predatory
traders with high-speed connections exploit this delay, and submit buy orders
at that old price. With non-trivial probability [31], some of their buy orders
get filled at x, thus allowing them to immediately sell the security back for x¯,
risk-free [18]. This practice breaches the Fair Market Access property and has
been also observed in dark pools [8].
Scalping. This technique relies on very low-latency network links, violates Fair
Market Access property, and is usually combined with market snooping tech-
niques (e.g., pinging to identify large buy orders). Let a broker handling a large
buy order for 100,000 shares of company Z. Upon examining the order books
of all exchanges, the broker finds 60,000 in exchange E1 and 40,000 shares in
exchange E2, both at price x. The broker submits a buy order for 100,000 shares
3http://www.fixprotocol.org/
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to E1 and gets a partial fill for 60,000 at x. This also triggers a “ping” order set
by a predatory trader, informing them that a large order for Z is in the market
(see also “Pinging”). Following the order protection rule4, E1 now routes the
order to exchange E2 to buy the remaining 40,000 shares at price x. However,
the predatory trader utilizing its lower network latency, has already executed
a buy order in E2 for all available shares of Z at price x. When the broker’s
buy order for 40,000 share arrives to E2 (a few milliseconds after), the trader
matches it with a sell order at a slightly inflated price x¯ [8].
Queue Jumping. While initially speed was sufficient for predatory traders to
place their orders ahead of other market participants, the influx of technically
advanced investors caused this practice to lose its effectiveness. To maintain
their edge, predatory traders started using more sophisticated techniques that
rely on special (i.e., “exotic”) order types, allowing them to jump at the top of
the queue5, even if their order was not the first to enter the market.
In theory, these order types were accessible to all market participants and
thus everyone could bump up the priority of their orders. However, in many
cases exchange operators selectively disclosed them only to a subset of their
clients and failed to inform everyone else about their existence and operation
(Operational Transparency property) [4,19,14,3]. Nevertheless, these order types
were exploitable only by sophisticated traders with knowledge of the precedence
rules, very low-latency links and high processing power.
Hide & Light Orders is one of the most controversial order types. It was intro-
duced as a workaround to Rule 610(d) of Regulation NMS [1], which prohibits
orders that lock6 or cross7 the National Best Bid and Offer8. To abide by this
rule, exchanges temporarily adjust the price of the locking/crossing orders to
be a tick (i.e., the minimum price movement) lower/higher than the NBBO, for
as long as the market remains locked. Once the market unlocks, the prices are
slid back to their original values. However, this does not apply to Hide & Light
orders, which retain their original price and are instead switched to being hidden
(i.e., non-displayed). Once the market unlocks, they are automatically lighten
up again. This seemingly subtle difference corrupted the price-time priority of
4The Order Protection Rule of Regulation NMS (Rule 611) introduced the National
Best Bid and Offer requirement that protects investors from receiving sub-optimal
prices for their quotes. In particular, Rule 611 mandates that exchanges should either
reject marketable orders or route them to the exchange with the best price.
5Orders that are closer to the top of the order book have access to more liquidity
and better prices [23].
6A buy order at price x in an exchange E1 locks the market, if there is another sell
order for the same price x in another exchange E2 [33].
7A market is crossed if a buy order is posted at a price that is higher than the best
(lowest) existing sell order, or inversely if a sell order is posted at a price lower than
the best (highest) bid [33]
8The NBBO index is updated throughout the day with the lowest selling price and
the highest buying bid (from all US exchanges) in order to ensure that investors receive
the best possible price
10 V. Mavroudis
the queue, as lighten-up orders where placed in front of price-adjusted orders
regardless of their relative ranking before the lock.
Day Intermarket Sweep Orders is another controversial order type, which is
prioritized over all other types, including Hide & Light orders9. Day ISOs are
based on a special exception in the Regulation NMS and are executed imme-
diately without verifying if they lock or cross the market (the trader assumes
all the regulation compliance liability). While their original motivation was to
help institutional investors place large orders without chasing liquidity through-
out the market, Day ISOs were quickly proven exploitable by predatory traders.
In particular, ISOs were used by sophisticated traders with high-speed market
activity feeds to rapidly react to market events, and place themselves ahead of
regular investors that: 1) did not use Day ISOs, and 2) relied on the slow Stock
Information Provider2 to find the NBBO.
5 Countermeasures
Market regulation is an obvious measure of protection against predatory traders
and manipulation practices. Until now, there have been several incidents where
market operators and traders were accused of wrongdoing and settled to pay
penalties [4,3,36,20]. However, keeping up with the latest manipulation practices,
trading styles, market mechanisms, and distinguishing malicious-intent from ir-
rational behavior is far from trivial [13,38]. For this reason, a small body of work
has proposed and, in some cases, deployed technical countermeasures that aim
to prevent all or some of these practices. These countermeasures do not seek to
replace regulators, but aim to alleviate or at least reduce the opportunities for
mechanical arbitrage.
As discussed in Section 4, many of the manipulation techniques require that
the trader can submit, alter and cancel orders within a few milliseconds. For
this reason, several exchanges introduced “speed-bumps” that delay the incom-
ing orders and outgoing messages by a predefined amount of time. For exam-
ple, the Investors Exchange (IEX) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) use
“speed-bumps” that introduce delay of 350 microseconds [16] and 1–3 millisec-
onds respectively [21,15]. So far, “speed-bumps” have shown promising results
in thwarting manipulation techniques that rely on low latency. However, studies
are not yet conclusive regarding their effects on the market [21]. Similarly, [18]
introduces an alternative market design that uses discrete time instead of con-
tinuous. The authors argue that this design stops the arms race for speed and
eliminates the risk-less latency-based arbitrage opportunities. While most of the
countermeasures require changes to the market design, there are certain steps
that investors can take to protect themselves from specific attacks. For example,
“latency tables” (Section 4) can be mitigated by adding noise on the timestamp
of the submitted instructions.
9This prioritization rule concerns only the first Day ISO to enter the market and
every subsequent Day ISO receives standard arrival time priority [14].
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Due to the above efforts, the rising infrastructure costs and the diminishing
returns, high frequency (i.e., very low-latency) trading activity has been steadily
declining in the past few years [26]. Simultaneously, markets for other financial
assets (e.g., currencies) have seen an increase in low-latency activity [9,26].
6 Conclusions & Future Work
This work aims to shed light on the technical aspects of market manipulation and
to highlight the relevance of security analysis techniques and secure engineering
principles to that problem. Toward this goal, we introduced a set of basic fairness
properties, and used them to examine different market manipulation techniques
and their mitigation counterparts. It is our hope that this new research direction
will complement the legislative efforts for fair and transparent markets. While
we focused on stock exchanges, future research could also investigate the risks
that the average investor faces in unregulated cryptocurrency exchanges and
decentralized trading platforms.
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